A parodic argument against modal distinctions

(This is a parody of that : An account of McTaggart's argument against time)


 We begin our argument by distinguishing two ways in which possible worlds can be described. First, possible worlds can be described according to their possession of properties like being actual, being merely possible. (These properties are now referred at as “A properties.”) We call the series of worlds ordered by these properties “the A series.” But we say that possible worlds can also be ordered by two-place relations like being merely possible considered from, actual considered from, etc. (These relations are now called “B relations.”) We call the series of worlds ordered by these relations “the B series.”

 We claim that the B series alone does not properly permits one world to be distinguished as actual. I.e., we are saying that the A series is essential to modal distinctions. Our reason for this is that reality is essential to modal distinction, and the B series without the A series does not involve genuine reality (since B series worlds are equally possible, whereas A series propositions assign a world as the real one).

 We also claim that the A series is inherently contradictory. For the different A properties are incompatible with one another. (No world can be both actual and merely possible.) Nevertheless, we insist, each world in the A series must possess all of the different A properties. (Since a possible world is from itself actual.)

 One response to our argument that we anticipate involves claiming that it's not true of any world, w, that w is both actual and merely possible. Rather, the objection goes, we must say that w is merely possible from the actual world, and is actual from itself. But this objection fails, according to us, because the additional points of view that are invoked in order to explain w's possession of the incompatible A properties must themselves possess all of the same A properties (as must any further modal points of view invoked on account of these additional points of view, and so on ad infinitum). Thus, according to us, we never resolve the original contradiction inherent in the A series, but, instead, merely generate an infinite regress of more and more contradictions.

 Since, according to us, the supposition that there is an A series leads to contradiction, and since there can be no modal distinction without an A series, we conclude that modal distinction itself, including both the A series and the B series, is to be rejected.

Needless to say, despite arguments such as ours, many philosophers will remained convinced of the pertinence of modal distinctions (for it certainly seems like there is a modal characteristic of the world). But a number of philosophers might be convinced by at least one part of our argument, namely, the part about the contradiction inherent in the A series. That is, some philosophers might be persuaded by us that the A series is not the case, even though they won't go so far as to deny the reality of modal distinction itself. These philosophers will accept the view (soon to be called “Lewisian modal realism”) that the B series is all there is to modalities. According to Lewisian modal realism, there are no genuine, unanalyzable A properties, and all talk that appears to be about A properties is really reducible to talk about B relations. For example, when we say that the world where Jesus is a girl has the property of being merely possible, all we really mean is that this world is not the world at which we are speaking. On this view, there is no sense in which it is true to say that one world is the real one, and any appearance to the contrary is merely a result of the way we humans happen to perceive our world.

The opponents of The Lewisian modal realism accept the view (often referred to as “Actualism”) that there are genuine properties such as being actual, being merely possible, etc.; that facts about these A properties are not in any way reducible to facts about B relations. According to Actualism, the reality of our world is indeniable and absolute, and not merely some mind-dependent phenomenon.

The Actualist might be happy to concede our claim that there can be no modal distinction without an A series, but the typical Actualist will want to reject the part of our argument that says that the A series is inherently contradictory. For the typical Actualist will deny our claim that each world in the A series must possess all of the different A properties. That is, she will deny that it is true of any world, w, that w is actual and merely possible. Instead, she will insist, the closest thing to this that can be true of a world, w, is (for example) that w might have been actual, and is merely possible, where the difference of modality in this claim is not to be analyzed away (just as the apparent references to the putative A properties actuality and mere possibility are not to be analyzed away in favor of reference to B relations).

Thus the standard Actualist response to our argument involves the notion that we must “take modalities seriously,” in the sense that there is a fundamental distinction between (for example) saying that x is F and saying that x might have been F. The thesis can be put this way.

Taking Modality Seriously: The verbal modality of ordinary language (expressions like ‘it is the case that’, ‘it might have been the case that’) must be taken as primitive and unanalyzable.

In virtue of her commitment to Taking Modality Seriously, the Actualist will say that no world ever possesses all of the different A properties. Thus, according to the Actualist, there is no contradiction in the A series — i.e., no contradiction in saying of a world, w, that w is actual, and might have been merely possible — and, hence, no contradiction to be passed along the different worlds at which w is actual and might have been actual.

In effect, then, the typical Actualist makes exactly the move in response to our argument that we anticipated, and explicitly rejected. Not surprisingly, then, many Lewisian will feel that the Actualist response fails.

(Cf.: An account of McTaggart's argument against time)

Relativism, Solipsism, and Absolute Truth.

Solipsism may simply be the idea that the valuation of certain (or maybe all) truths is to be referred to my point of view. For example, I may hold that 'good' means 'good for me' (not simply 'held as good by me' nor 'leading to my personal interest' but really 'related-to-me-good'), like I could say : 'Now' is the sixth of March or 'Here' is Bagnolet in Paris's suburb, which means related-to-me now and here. Some other truths could be related to my point of view, such as the truth's valuation of the existence of colours, or of the existence of anything whatsoever, or maybe even of logical laws. Theoretical Egoism (the idea that all that is 'good' is 'good for me') can only be based on such a consideration that unmodalized 'good' is simply devoid of any meaning whatsoever.

There is several ways one is to interpret and formalize such an Idea, that the fact that 'x is P' has a meaning only 'to you' : It could mean that it is relatively to you that x is P, as opposed to relatively to others, or as opposed to being true simpliciter, so that it is true relatively. Or it could mean that it is absolutely true, but that any such true proposition implies a transcendental frame, for example that it is noematic. In the first case, the proposition could be formalized by 'For me(Px)', 'x is-for-me P', and I could take into account somebody else's point of view in the following manner : 'somebody(Px)'. In the second case I could even write 'Px', but in any case, I should consider that there is no general valuation, i.e. no valuation outside a subjectivity, but for example an egoistic absolute valuation, and possibly modalized alternatives ; or maybe only modalized subjective valuations.

In fact, three possibilities are given :

- strict relativism, holding that every truth (or every truth of some kind) is valuated relatively to a subject : 'for me(Px)', 'for Bill(Dx)', 'for Dun(Ex)', etc. ;

- strict solipsism which denies the existence of other subjects and has an absolute though egoistic valuation ;

- open solipsism which conciliates absolute and modalized valuations (me and others) : 'Px' and 'for Bill(~Px)'.

I do not believe that the form adopted ('for me(Px)' or plainly 'Px') is crucial regarding which of those positions you hold. Formally, if one is to compare his point of view with others, even if others are pseudo-subjectivities, or with a pseudo-objective truth, he may modalize his own point of view, knowing that it is in fact the absolute though egoistic truth.

Open solipsism actually presents one with certain interesting facts : a solipsist would deny the indexicality of certain terms : interestingly enough, 'me' would not be indexical any more (it would just be a transcendental condition, and a certain object within the frame) but 'you' would still be. 'You' would actually be relative to the pseudo-subject I consider myself speaking to. Spatio-temporal indexical terms would be more intricate. One is presented here with an alternative : either one considers only one's momentaneous ego to be existent (but I can hardly conceive how  that wouldn't lead to madness) or she considers herself perduring through time. In the first case, here and now certainly are not indexical, but plainly absolute. In the second case, even if she believes in the so-called 'A-series time' so that 'now' and 'here' would indeed be absolute, and their valuation unmodalized, they could still be modalized in a concurrent B-series conception, in order to compare one present self with one's former selves (in the same way as the absolute valuation of my egoistic truth can be modalized in a sort of relativist-B-series). We would then see that 'here' is indeed indexical, but only temporally, and not spatially ! It is relative not to points of space, nor subjects, but only to moments of time in which I am. One may continue this interesting inquiry.

I shall now speak of two authors who have tried to break by means of demonstration the fortress of radical solipsism. By 'radical solipsism', I mean the hypothesis that simply no valuation whatsoever is to be made unmodalized, not even logical tautology. These two authors are two of my favourite French philosophers : René Descartes and Quentin Meillassoux, and I should add that I believe they both succeeded in such a demonstration (even though, maybe not as widely as they hope). It must be noted that neither of them can be said to have used a 'logical' demonstration, i.e. a demonstration by means of true axioms and logical coherence. They both used a reductio to what is now called a 'pragmatic contradiction', i.e. the contradiction between what is hold and the fact that it is held. It may be considered natural that they should have done so, considering their opponent, who would have modalized every axiom possibly used in the demonstration. Their reasoning had therefore to be somehow extra-logical. It must also be noted that their respective opponents are somehow their personal creations. They both considered themselves threatened by scepticism, which in both context was identified with a solipsism of some kind, either Montaigne-like for Descartes or 'Correlationist' for Meillassoux, and were both in search of an absolute truth that a solipsist could not deny*.

Descartes made substantially the following remark : the fact that 'for me(something)' isn't, itself, modalized. It is therefore absolutely true that 'for me(something)', and therefore absolutely true that there exists at least one point of view, namely mine. And it cannot help to modalize and say 'for me(for me(something))', because the situation would be exactly the same then. This amounts to say that the modalization isn't in itself modalized. Of course, it is not per se a very useful fact, but Descartes will try and go on, saying that 'for me(I exist and my existence implies the existence of God)', which, if true, is, as he has proven, absolutely true, implies that I must hold that God exists simpliciter. I personally would agree with the implication, but not with the premise, although this is not my point here.

Quentin Meillassoux made substantially the following remark : there is at least one proposition p and one true statement 'for me(p and possibly not p)' such as the latter can only mean 'for me(p) and possibly not p, simpliciter'. More specifically, If I want to say every true proposition must be true relatively-to-my-conditions-of-knowing-it, I must either say that I know it necessary that any thing can only ever be in accordance with my conditions, and then that my point of view is itself absolutely necessary, or that it is absolutely true that something other-than-my-knowing-it is possible.

The demonstration is the following :

I try to avoid the idea that it is an absolute necessity (which I'm aware of) that everything that is true, is true relatively-to-my-knowing it. So I have to state that possibly something is independent. And if something is independent, then it differs from an object constrained by the frame of my subjectivity. So possibly 'independently(p)'. But how is this statement to be understood ? If its truth is dependant on my knowing-it (for me[possibly 'independently(p)']), then wouldn't I be there to think of it, 'independently(p)' wouldn't be possible, and therefore p is dependant. On the contrary, if it is possible that its truth is independent of  my knowing-it, (possibly 'independently[possibly 'independently(p)']) then the redundant possibility and independence amount to a possibility of independence simpliciter. Therefore this possibility is an absolute and independent truth, while Descartes's absolute truth was nonetheless dependant on my existence.

Again, this may seem to be rather poor. It becomes richer when combined with the intuition that we indeed know that our frame of reference isn't a necessary frame, and the intuition that for every state of affairs we know it isn't necessarily true that the world is such. If true, this intuition cannot depend on us.

*This solipsist sceptic is to be opposed to the Ancient sceptic who could rather hold that both opposite propositions are equally plausible.

Good as a Whole/Part of a Good

"It is, in fact, always misleading to take a whole, that is valuable (or the reverse), and then to ask simply: To which of its constituents does this whole owe its value or its vileness? It may well be that it owes it to none ; and, if one of them does appear to have some value in itself, we shall be led into the grave error of supposing that all the value of the whole belongs to it alone. It seems to me that this error has commonly been committed with regard to pleasure. Pleasure does seem to be a necessary constituent of most valuable wholes; and, since the other constituents, into which we may analyse them, may easily seem not to have any value, it is natural to suppose that all the value belongs to pleasure. That this natural supposition does not follow from the premises is certain; and that it is, on the contrary, ridiculously far from the truth appears evident to my 'reflective judgment'."

G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, §55

Catastrophe

"An existential risk is one where an adverse outcome would annihilate Earth‐originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential for future development. We can identify a number of potential existential risks: nuclear war fought with stockpiles much greater than those that exist today (maybe resulting from future arms races); a genetically engineered superbug; environmental disaster; asteroid impact; wars or terrorists act committed with powerful future weapons, perhaps based on advanced forms of nanotechnology; superintelligent general artificial intelligence with destructive goals; high‐energy physics experiments; a permanent global Brave‐New‐World‐like totalitarian regime protected from revolution by new surveillance and mind control technologies. These are just some of the existential risks that have been discussed in the literature, and considering that many of these have been conceptualized only in recent decades, it is plausible to assume that there are further existential risks that we have not yet thought of."

Nick Bostrom, Why i hope the search for extraterrestrial life finds nothing

Ce qui "existe" et ce qui "n'existe pas"

« S’il n’existe dans le monde, comme nous sommes en effet fondés à le croire, rien qui ne soit ou bien d’ordre physique ou bien d’ordre psychique, la métaphysique est assurément, pour autant qu’elle s’attache aussi bien à ce qui est physique qu’à ce qui est psychique, la science de la totalité de la réalité effective. Dans cette mesure, sont naturellement aussi d’ordre métaphysique les thèses fondamentales du monisme – qui prétend à l’identité essentielle du psychique et du physique – et celle du dualisme – qui affirme la différence essentielle de ces deux ordres. Mais reconnaître deux choses pour identiques ou pour différentes, c’est reconnaître en fait quelque chose qui est rapport avec ces deux choses : cette connaissance concerne aussi bien l’identité que la différence ; et l’identité est elle-même à son tour rien moins qu’une chose, tout comme la différence. L’une et l’autre sont extérieures à la disjonction entre physique et psychique parce qu’elles se situent hors de ce qui est réel. Or il existe aussi un savoir de la non-réalité : et que l’on accorde aux tâches de la métaphysique une généralité propre aussi grande qu’on voudra, il y a des problématiques encore plus générales que celles de cette dernière, des problématiques pour lesquelles l’orientation essentielle qui ramène la métaphysique vers la réalité effective ne constitue nullement une limite. De telles problématiques sont précisément celles de la théorie de l'objet. »

Alexius Meinong, Théorie de l'objet (1904), trad. Jean-François Courtine et Marc de Launay.

Ou Zénon, ou Dieu/ Either Zeno, or God

Cet article défendra la thèse suivante : 

De deux choses l'une, ou bien le mouvement est impossible, ou bien une remontée à l'infini des causes est possible en un temps fini, si court soit-il.

Commençons par préciser ce qu'on entend par là. On suppose que la structure du temps est celle d'un continu. Ceci étant donné, ou bien tout mouvement réel, y compris tout passage du temps, tout changement quantifiable, est impossible ; ou bien il est possible de rendre raison du commencement de l'existence des choses après une certaine date, date précédée d'une infinité de néant  (ou de ce qu'on voudra), sans faire appel à une cause ultime.

Si nous obtenons une telle alternative, c'est pour une raison simple : il y a un unique raisonnement qui rend possibles, ou bien impossibles, selon qu'on l'interprète positivement ou négativement, uniment le mouvement et la remontée à l'infini des causes en un temps fini. Ce raisonnement a son origine, apparemment non-formalisée, dans la Grèce du cinquième siècle avant Jésus-Christ, et a pour auteur Zénon d'Elée, on le connaît habituellement sous deux formes et sous les noms de "La dichotomie" et "l'Achille" (1).

Je reformule ainsi l'argument avec le vocabulaire du temps, mais le vocabulaire du mouvement conviendrait parfaitement avec les substitutions suivantes : "distance parcourue" remplace "durée écoulée", "point" remplace "instant", "ici" remplace "maintenant".

Soit l'intervalle ]AB] de durée déja écoulée, de telle sorte que B soit "maintenant". La question est : est-il possible que cet intervalle s'accroisse ? La durée peut-elle continuer de s'écouler ?

1. On pose qu'un élément du temps, tel qu'il peut s'ajouter à un intervalle de durée, ne peut être qu'un instant ou une autre durée, c'est-à-dire un point ou un intervalle.

On se donne la continuité du temps et donc en particulier les deux propriétés suivantes : 

2. Un instant n'a jamais de suivant.

3. En toute durée, il est possible de distinguer deux parties telles que la seconde est strictement postérieure à la première.

4. Or l'intervalle de durée écoulée, ]AB], ne peut pas commencer à s'accroître avec l'ajout d'une partie temporelle ]BC], puisque l'ajout de ]BC] suppose au moins un autre ajout antérieur. [3]

5. Or l'intervalle ]AB] ne peut pas commencer à s'accroître avec un instant B' qui suivrait B, puisqu'un tel instant n'existe pas. [2]

6. Donc l'intervalle ]AB] ne peut pas commencer à s'accroître. [1, 4, 5]

Ma thèse ici est donc que, loin d'être fondés sur une mauvaise compréhension du continu, ou de l'infini, les arguments de Zénon sont fondés sur une intuition correcte des propriétés du continu, et précisément pour cela peuvent en inférer l'impossibilité d'un quelconque mouvement.

Je ferai deux commentaires : 

- le premier, c'est que cet argument, s'il est valide, ne gênera profondément que les tenants de ce qu'on appelle une "théorie A" du temps, c'est-à-dire ceux qui veulent soutenir qu'il y a un sens réel à poser que le temps passe, s'écoule, que l'ensemble du temps passé du monde s'accroît. Les "éternalistes", ou tenants d'une "théorie B" du temps, se verront peut-être renforcés dans leur opinion.

- le deuxième, c'est qu'il est possible de reformuler l'argument en une question, qui le rend plus saisissant : est-il au juste possible qu'un mouvement commence s'il n'existe aucun instant de ce commencement ? à nouveau, un éternaliste ne verra peut-être pas là un problème particulier, puisqu'il arguera que pour tout point de ce mouvement, pour tout état de ce changement, pour tout instant de cette durée qui s'écoule sans avoir de début à son écoulement, il peut donner la position correspondante dans la dimension temporelle.

Passons maintenant à la question de la remontée à l'infini. Je n'examinerai pas tous les aspects du problème ici, mais uniquement ce qui concerne le point que je veux exposer.

Soit l'hypothèse selon laquelle certaines choses au moins existent, qui requièrent une raison, une cause, pour leur existence, cause ou raison qui ne se confond pas avec ces choses.

7. Il existe une chose "E" telle qu'une chose différente rend raison de l'existence de E, et telle que E ne rend pas raison de sa propre existence.

Soit le principe qui veut que si A est raison de B, et B raison de C, alors il y a sens à dire que A est raison de C.

8. A rend raison de B et B rend raison de C => A rend raison de C.

Soit un second principe qui dit que si rien ne rend raison de la raison d'une chose, alors la chose reste inexpliquée.

9. Si A rend raison de B, alors il existe C tel que C rend raison de A.

Par hypothèse [7], le système ne peut pas former de boucle, c'est-à-dire que E ne peut apparaître qu'une fois, et non être cause d'une de ses causes, sinon par principe [8] E serait raison d'elle-même.

Nous en arrivons à ce stade au très classique "argument cosmologique" (en faveur de l'existence de Dieu), c'est-à-dire que l'on peut établir que, de deux choses l'une, ou bien nous avons une remontée à l'infini de cause en cause, ou bien il existe, sinon absolument une cause première, du moins une chose qui rend raison d'elle-même. Je fais, pour les besoins de la discussion, l'hypothèse qu'une telle chose auto-explicative n'existe pas, et m'intéresse à la cohérence de cette remontée à l'infini.

Je ne discute pas ici du fait de savoir si expliquer chaque élément de la chaîne est satisfaisant, ou si pour avoir une explication il est requis d'expliquer la chaîne elle-même, mais je l'admets par hypothèse, ayant supposé que quelque chose rend bel et bien raison de E. Le problème qui m'intéresse ici est temporel. Au mot de "cause", ou de "raison", on donnera le sens que l'on désire. Il est tout à fait indifférent à la question, en particulier, que cette causalité soit "linéaire" (c'est-à-dire qu'un effet puisse survivre à sa cause, et que celle-ci doive l'avoir précédé, comme le mouvement de la balle de base-ball est produit par le joueur, qui doit l'avoir précédée, mais elle peut se perpétuer sans lui) ou "hiérarchique" (c'est-à-dire que l'existence actuelle de la cause soit condition de celle de l'effet, comme le chanteur pour son chant). Dans le cas de la cause hiérarchique, on pourrait supposer qu'il est possible que l'existence de toutes n'advient qu'à un instant t particulier (2), mais cela ne marcherait pas pour la cause linéaire. On supposera donc, pour se donner la plus grande contrainte possible, qu'une cause, si elle n'est pas identique à son effet, doit l'avoir précédé dans l'existence pendant un temps fini, et doit continuer à exister tant que son effet existe. Dans ces conditions, il pourrait sembler, et il a été soutenu, qu'une telle régression à l'infini de l'explication implique un temps infini, et par conséquent aussi l'existence d'êtres depuis toujours.

Mais cette conclusion est évidemment fausse.


Soit t1 le premier instant de l'existence de E.
Soit C1 la chose qui rend raison de E, dont je dis qu'elle est venue à l'existence une seconde avant E.
Soit C2 la chose qui rend raison de C1, dont je dis qu'elle est venue à l'existence 1/2 seconde avant C1.
Soit en général Cn+1 la chose qui rend raison de Cn, dont je dis qu'elle est venue à l'existence 1/2 puissance n seconde avant Cn.

On aura alors bel est bien une remontée à l'infini des causes, sans que l'ensemble du processus de causation prenne plus de 2 secondes. Les conditions sont remplies, puisque chaque cause survit tant que son effet survit, et l'a précédé dans le monde pendant une durée finie. On aurait donc rendu adéquatement raison de l'existence des choses en un temps très bref.

Mais concevons alors la situation suivante : je suppose dans le passé un temps infini durant lequel rien n'existe. Une infinité de néant. Je pose un instant t1 dans lequel quelque chose existe. Je désire alors savoir ce qui rend raison de l'existence de ce quelque chose, pourquoi son existence en cet instant et pas dans l'infinité temporelle qui l'a précédé, pourquoi cette chose plutôt qu'une autre, etc. Si on peut, comme on l'a montré, opérer une remontée à l'infini des causes en un temps fini, il en ressort que je peux donner une explication adéquate de l'existence de ce quelque chose en t1, sans remonter très loin dans le temps.

Considérons ce résultat. Il me paraît à la fois solide et terriblement problématique, car enfin, on rend compte adéquatement de l'existence de quelque chose, sur strict fond de néant, on rend compte strictement de la venue radicale à l'existence de quelque chose plutôt que rien, sans qu'il existe un commencement, un lieu ou un instant de cette venue à l'existence. Il existe un instant t0 (t1 - 2 secondes) tel qu'en t0 rien n'existe mais qu'en un instant quelconque postérieur à t0 quelque chose existe, et l'apparition de toute chose est suffisamment expliquée par l'existence d'une chose antérieure. Il y a à mon sens quelque chose de paradoxal à un tel commencement brutal de l'existence, possible justement parce qu'il n'a aucun commencement.

Mais si on refuse cette situation, on doit reconnaître que Zénon a raison de déclarer le changement impossible, car les raisons de l'acceptation ou du refus semblent devoir être les mêmes dans l'un ou l'autre cas.

(1) Comme la plupart des commentateurs de ces arguments, je soutiendrai qu'ils ont généralement été mal compris par le passé. Ou plus précisément, que la solution standard de ces paradoxes manquent la pointe de l'argument et se méprennent, sinon sur l'intention de l'auteur, au moins sur la portée de ses propos. Sur la discussion des solutions historiquement apportées aux paradoxes, je renvoie à un travail en cours.

(2) Dans la philosophie de Plotin, par exemple, et pour exprimer les choses grossièrement, chaque "niveau" de l'être est cause formelle du niveau qui lui est postérieur (par exemple l'intellect est forme de l'âme). Une telle causalité est censée rendre compte réellement de l'être des choses, et ne nécessite aucun temps pour s'accomplir. Plotin demande une sortie du système de l'être, pour que l'on ne remonte pas à l'infini, mais l'on peut peut-être concevoir un système plotinien infini, advenant en un unique instant.

Some more problems about identity, survival, and stuff

Un post entièrement en anglais :

I just discovered this blog : http://philosophyandpsychology.com/, and I wanted to comment on two posts, but I somehow got carried away, and it got so long that it's better suited here.

I'm commenting, first this post :
http://philosophyandpsychology.com/?p=1875 "Why you can't be harmed by your own death"

Then this one : http://philosophyandpsychology.com/?p=1867 "Some thoughts on why I would kill myself in order to teleport"

About the first one :
I must say I am myself very fond of the Epicurus's thesis you point out, to which I've been committed since the first time I read it. However, I'd have two comments, because I feel that your commitment to it is maybe a little too easy.

First, although I think you are right to distinguish between the hedonist claim and the claim that the existence of the subject is required for something to harm it, I don't think you can really (and neither can I) deal with the infantile adult case. For, though a subject indeed still exists, it is doubtful that it is the same subject as before, if he/she has really been lobotomized. I'm committed here (and I think you're bound to be so) with David Lewis's thesis in Identity and Survival : if you think that what constitutes the subject to be harmed is basically mental states (may them be unconscious), then you have to hold that the existence of one specific subject through time is isomorphic with the continuity and the inter-relatedness between its mental states. Therefore, i think you should claim that no harm is made to the former subject in the very existence of the lobotomized latter. The case is really the same as death : the "harm" is only objective, from a viewer's, or God's point of view, or subjective for relatives and friends or for an irrational subject, in the past, considering the future. If there is no way for any previous perspective of the subject to connect with the present impoverished mental states, I can't see how you could hold that a subject is being harmed. And it is almost the same if the person still remembers the previous perspectives, but cannot feel them as his/hers. The immediate problem is that, although I maintain it would be an objective loss, it becomes very difficult to make things matter every time a personality change is at stake.

Second, I'd turn to the objective side of the argument. My point concerns also the holders of the “Deprivation thesis”, and is inspired by Meillassoux's perspectives in Spectral Dilemma and The Divine Inexistence : if death possibly is, in any circumstance, a loss, then it should be a loss in every circumstance, always and everywhere. In fact, every death is arguably an early death, and if Susie's early death is tragic, then every death should also be tragic. I mean that if the problem in death isn't subjective, then it's tragicness proliferates. For example, you made the point that “according to one version of the Deprivation Thesis, we can determine that Susie’s death was bad for her by making a simple comparison between what happened in her actual life (early death) and what happened in a near possible world (long life). Since she might have experienced 50 more years of well-being in the near possible world, Susie’s early death is bad for her because it deprived her of all that well-being”. And you seem to maintain that although not subjectively for Susie, it still might be objectively true. But then again, there is also a possible world where Susie lived 100 years longer, 1000 years longer, or for ever, in well-being or whatever state you think is worthy of humanity (morality, contemplation, etc.). You may answer that we shouldn't worry about that because in those worlds the laws of ours don't apply, but I'd say : that's precisely the tragedy ! The event of her death occurred, instead of the event of laws' change. Let's put aside the general question of “loss of potential” (it would lead us too far to regret that a maximal sum of potentialities isn't realized in our world), and focus only on subject-related loss : a human person is arguably worthy of immortality since we cannot see a limit to what he/she is capable of, through an unlimited time.

I hope that I'm not talking too foolishly, and that I've made my points clear.

About the second post, I'd have two remarks, again.

First, the 99,999999999999999999... %. Why so many 9s ? Actually, the ellipsis suggests infinity and therefore the will for the machine to work 100% of the time ; but even without it, I believe you don't need so many 9s for the machine to be even safer than train or whatever way of transportation you want. And yet I feel you would indeed want quite a guarantee that you wouldn't be simply destroyed by the machine. I'm not sure why, maybe we're just not used to teleporters, or maybe it is somehow related to my second remark.

Secondly, then, I'm not sure about your justification of why not press the purple button, in opposition to the green one. I agree that you shouldn't press the purple button. I want to agree that you should press the green button, but I'm not sure about that either.

Let me explain myself: if the difference between the purple button and the green one was simply utility, then you'd expect pressing the green one to be pertinent (which it is) and pressing the purple one to be indifferent or pointless (which it is not). If it matters that much that you don't press it, if it would be suicide, but pressing the green button is ok, it must be that in one case someone is killed, and in the other case not. Let's reverse the situation. The voice doesn't address to the former you in Orlando but to the new you in L.A. and you/L.A. has the choice to press the purple button and destroy your old copy in Orlando. Wouldn't that be murder ? Murder, and not suicide. So the problem really is about who's who, and not utility. For pressing the green button to be useful, it has to be useful to you, and nobody else, and then you have to be sure that it is still you in L.A. But if we are in the situation you've described, you are you in Orlando, so what ?

Let's say now that the former you as only partially been destroyed, so that the living organism is still functioning, but the mind is completely gone. I believe it wouldn't be murder for you/L.A. to destroy that organism, although you'd feel it's not you. At this point, I'd like to evoke David Lewis's paper again : he would say that in the situation you've described, two people are at stake, sharing the same past, but living different mental lives. So of course the you/Orlando wouldn't want to kill himself, since he is not the same person as the you/LA who resembles him. And that's why it would be murder for you/L.A., to kill you/Orlando. In the third situation, there is no you/Orlando, so no question about that. But then comes a fourth situation : the former you, has not been destroyed at all, but what is called, in the year 2234, “ultrafrozen”, so much so that he didn't have a single brain, or physiological, reaction, since the process of teleportation has begun, but he still could be “hyperdefrosted” and live a normal life (this system aims to offer a guarantee in case something goes wrong during the atomic reassembling). Would it be murder to destroy it ? Would it be suicide to sign, before the teleportation, that you know such a frozen you is gonna be destroyed, and you still want to go (although obviously, even for teleportation, nobody would read the terms and conditions...) ? I think it's quite clear that destroying the ultrafrozen you, for you/L.A., wouldn't be suicide, even though you share the same name with that thing in Orlando. But destroying an organism that could be reanimated and live a life of its own, it does sound like murder. Personally, I'd say that, if teleportation isn't suicide altogether, then you should be able to indifferently destroy that ultrafrozen thing, because no other you has lived since the teleportation, and YOU are not this thing. But that teleportation isn't suicide isn't obvious to me.

Let's now take another situation (beware, it's gonna be severely fictionnal) : you discover that there is, in our world (and not another possible world) another dimension (and only one), in which there is another earth, exactly the same, with another you, exactly the same (atom by atom), but that one of the two is gonna be destroyed, only one and there's no way to predict which one, in a quantum-mecanic-like situation. The two of you are gonna stay exactly the same, have the same thoughts, the same fears, until the very moment it happens (I admit the situation isn't quite likely). If you think teleportation isn't suicide, shouldn't you think there is actually one person at stake, and not two ? You say : “The reassembled clone is atom-by-atom identical to the you that pressed the green button. You can’t get any better in terms of continuity of identity than an atom-by-atom preservation.“ But if you stand that identity is informational identity, or informational + contextual identity, then the two of you are even literally identical. I'm not sure, something like that. At least, you should think that no one of the two can really be killed, since he'll have an identical substitute, like in teleportation (although the family and friends of one of the two would indeed think, wrongly, that their beloved is dead). There is a difference between informational identity, or even complete inter-relatedness of mental states, and continuity in itself. It strangely seems to me that an individual that would have exactly the same memory as I would, had I survived, would not be me if a break of some sort had occurred.

Let's admit that position, for argument's sake. Let's suppose that teleportation is suicide, + the creation of some identical other person. Now, maybe what you wanted to say, was that teleportation is indeed suicide, but a useful suicide, to be opposed to the useless suicide of the purple button. And I'm not sure about that either, but I guess that, maybe, if you hold that death is harmless in a subjective point of view, like you do, since objectively no harm is done in teleportation, for an identical new person is created, then teleportation is ok. Suicide, but ok. (at least, no more harm is done than in no replicating a person when there's no use for it, no more potential is lost). But then, what about the purple button ? I'm not sure about the utility argument. It's arguable that you're relatives would freak if there were two “you”. Even the you/L.A would. So it would be useful to destroy yourself (and consider the legal issues in the duplication of you).

Please tell me where I'm wrong !