Solipsism may
simply be the idea that the valuation of certain (or maybe all)
truths is to be referred to my point of view. For example, I may
hold that 'good' means 'good for me' (not simply 'held as good by me'
nor 'leading to my personal interest' but really
'related-to-me-good'), like I could say : 'Now' is the sixth of
March or 'Here' is Bagnolet in Paris's suburb, which means
related-to-me now and here. Some other truths could be related to my
point of view, such as the truth's valuation of the existence of
colours, or of the existence of anything whatsoever, or maybe even of
logical laws. Theoretical Egoism (the idea that all that is
'good' is 'good for me') can only be based on such a consideration
that unmodalized 'good' is simply devoid of any meaning whatsoever.
There is several
ways one is to interpret and formalize such an Idea, that the fact
that 'x is P' has a meaning only 'to you' : It could mean that
it is relatively to you that x is P, as opposed to relatively to
others, or as opposed to being true simpliciter, so that
it is true relatively. Or it could mean that it is absolutely true,
but that any such true proposition implies a transcendental frame,
for example that it is noematic. In the first case, the proposition
could be formalized by 'For me(Px)', 'x is-for-me P', and I
could take into account somebody else's point of view in the
following manner : 'somebody(Px)'. In the second case I could even
write 'Px', but in any case, I should consider that there is no
general valuation, i.e. no valuation outside a
subjectivity, but for example an egoistic absolute valuation, and
possibly modalized alternatives ; or maybe only modalized subjective
valuations.
In fact, three
possibilities are given :
- strict
relativism, holding that every truth (or every truth of some
kind) is valuated relatively to a subject : 'for me(Px)', 'for
Bill(Dx)', 'for Dun(Ex)', etc. ;
- strict solipsism
which denies the existence of other subjects and has an absolute
though egoistic valuation ;
- open solipsism
which conciliates absolute and modalized valuations (me and others) :
'Px' and 'for Bill(~Px)'.
I do not believe
that the form adopted ('for me(Px)' or plainly 'Px') is crucial
regarding which of those positions you hold. Formally, if one is to
compare his point of view with others, even if others are
pseudo-subjectivities, or with a pseudo-objective truth, he may
modalize his own point of view, knowing that it is in fact the
absolute though egoistic truth.
Open solipsism
actually presents one with certain interesting facts : a solipsist
would deny the indexicality of certain terms :
interestingly enough, 'me' would not be indexical any more (it would
just be a transcendental condition, and a certain object within the
frame) but 'you' would still be. 'You' would actually be relative to
the pseudo-subject I consider myself speaking to. Spatio-temporal
indexical terms would be more intricate. One is presented here with
an alternative : either one considers only one's momentaneous ego to
be existent (but I can hardly conceive how that wouldn't lead
to madness) or she considers herself perduring through time. In the
first case, here and now certainly are not indexical, but plainly
absolute. In the second case, even if she believes in the so-called
'A-series time' so that 'now' and 'here' would indeed be absolute,
and their valuation unmodalized, they could still be modalized in a
concurrent B-series conception, in order to compare one present self
with one's former selves (in the same way as the absolute valuation
of my egoistic truth can be modalized in a sort of
relativist-B-series). We would then see that 'here' is indeed
indexical, but only temporally, and not spatially ! It is relative
not to points of space, nor subjects, but only to moments of time in
which I am. One may continue this interesting inquiry.
I shall now speak
of two authors who have tried to break by means of demonstration the
fortress of radical solipsism. By 'radical solipsism', I mean the
hypothesis that simply no valuation whatsoever is to be made
unmodalized, not even logical tautology. These two authors are two of
my favourite French philosophers : René Descartes and Quentin
Meillassoux, and I should add that I believe they both succeeded in
such a demonstration (even though, maybe not as widely as they hope).
It must be noted that neither of them can be said to have used a
'logical' demonstration, i.e. a demonstration by
means of true axioms and logical coherence. They both used
a reductio to what is now called a 'pragmatic
contradiction', i.e. the contradiction between what
is hold and the fact that it is held. It may be considered natural
that they should have done so, considering their opponent, who would
have modalized every axiom possibly used in the demonstration. Their
reasoning had therefore to be somehow extra-logical. It must also be
noted that their respective opponents are somehow their personal
creations. They both considered themselves threatened by scepticism,
which in both context was identified with a solipsism of some kind,
either Montaigne-like for Descartes or 'Correlationist' for
Meillassoux, and were both in search of an absolute truth that a
solipsist could not deny*.
Descartes made
substantially the following remark : the fact that 'for
me(something)' isn't, itself, modalized. It is therefore absolutely
true that 'for me(something)', and therefore absolutely true that
there exists at least one point of view, namely mine. And it cannot
help to modalize and say 'for me(for me(something))', because the
situation would be exactly the same then. This amounts to say that
the modalization isn't in itself modalized. Of course, it is not per
se a very useful fact, but Descartes will try and go on,
saying that 'for me(I exist and my existence implies the existence of
God)', which, if true, is, as he has proven, absolutely true, implies
that I must hold that God exists simpliciter. I
personally would agree with the implication, but not with the
premise, although this is not my point here.
Quentin
Meillassoux made substantially the following remark : there is at
least one proposition p and one true statement 'for me(p and possibly
not p)' such as the latter can only mean 'for me(p) and possibly not
p, simpliciter'. More specifically, If I want to say
every true proposition must be true
relatively-to-my-conditions-of-knowing-it, I must either say that I
know it necessary that any thing can only ever be in accordance with
my conditions, and then that my point of view is itself absolutely
necessary, or that it is absolutely true that something
other-than-my-knowing-it is possible.
The demonstration
is the following :
I try to avoid the
idea that it is an absolute necessity (which I'm aware of) that
everything that is true, is true relatively-to-my-knowing it. So I
have to state that possibly something is independent. And if
something is independent, then it differs from an object constrained
by the frame of my subjectivity. So possibly 'independently(p)'. But
how is this statement to be understood ? If its truth is dependant on
my knowing-it (for me[possibly 'independently(p)']), then wouldn't I
be there to think of it, 'independently(p)' wouldn't be possible, and
therefore p is dependant. On the contrary, if it is possible
that its truth is independent of my knowing-it, (possibly
'independently[possibly 'independently(p)']) then the redundant
possibility and independence amount to a possibility of
independence simpliciter. Therefore this possibility is
an absolute and independent truth, while Descartes's
absolute truth was nonetheless dependant on my existence.
Again, this may
seem to be rather poor. It becomes richer when combined with the
intuition that we indeed know that our frame of reference isn't a
necessary frame, and the intuition that for every state of affairs we
know it isn't necessarily true that the world is such. If true, this
intuition cannot depend on us.
*This solipsist sceptic is to be opposed to the Ancient sceptic who could rather hold that both opposite propositions are equally plausible.
